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Time, Money, and History
By David Edgerton*
ABSTRACT
This essay argues that taking the economy seriously in histories of science could not only
extend the range of activities studied but also change—often quite radically—our under-
standing of well-known cases and instances in twentieth-century science. It shows how
scientific intellectuals and historians of science have followed the money as a means of
critique of particular forms of science and of particular conceptions of science. It suggests
the need to go further, to a much broader implicit definition of what constitutes science—
one that implies a criticism of much history of twentieth-century science for defining it
implicitly and inappropriately in very restrictive ways.
T HE COMPANION TO THE HISTORY OF MODERN SCIENCE, edited by R. C. Olby,G. N. Cantor, J. R. R. Christie, and M. J. S. Hodge, remains the best introduction to
modern history of science. Any number of disciplines, arguments, interpretations, and
topics are covered. In different guises, we find discussion of science and philosophy,
literature, war, imperialism, nationalism, political ideology, society, the public, language,
sociology, and so on. The economy, industry, and money are inconspicuously absent, even
from the reflections on Marxism.1 Such omissions will surprise no one and will be
lamented by few. There appears to be an implicit and sometimes explicit concern that
dealing with “horrid political economy”—as Cecily puts it in Oscar Wilde’s The Impor-
tance of Being Earnest—will mean not merely tedium but imbibing methodological
poison—neoliberal, Marxist, perhaps mere naive quantification. But this is to make the
serious and vulgar error of conflating a vast area of human life and endeavor with
particular methods of studying it.
There is a good deal to gain by taking the world of production, consumption, work, and
the economy seriously in thinking about the conduct, nature, and consequences of natural
science. And such studies are hardly rare. Recent history of science has much to say about
* Centre for the History of Science, Technology, and Medicine, Imperial College London, London SW7 2AZ,
Great Britain.
I am grateful to Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, Santiago Lopez, William Thomas, and Abigail Woods for their incisive
comments.
1 R. C. Olby, G. N. Cantor, J. R. R. Christie, and M. J. S. Hodge, eds., Companion to the History of Modern
Science (London/New York: Routledge, 1990). In Edward J. Hackett, Olga Amsterdamska, Michael Lynch, and
Judy Wajcman, eds., The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
2007), one chapter out of thirty-eight concerns economic relations.
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money, about patronage and trade; the term “technoscience” is in common use; and the
idea that universities were not concerned with the economy before the 1980s is correctly
criticized. Moreover, the issue of the economy is now getting attention from leading
scholars in broader discussions of the policies for scientific research.2 Yet studies tend to
focus on the economic, monetary, and industrial relations of very particular kinds of
scientific research, those most distant from the economic whirl—that is, academic re-
search. Basing our picture on the full range of scientific activity in the economy, the polity,
and society would transform the map of natural science that guides research and teaching
in the history of modern science. I am not merely arguing for a larger scale of analysis,
or a more complete one; I believe that this new picture will lead us to new perspectives
on both broad issues in studies of science and society and on the traditional focus of
history of science—the academy. We need to think differently upon money’s relationship
with science. In the twentieth century, most research in science has been quite unprob-
lematically conducted in the search for profit, production, or military security. Yet
histories tend to focus on a single site—the academy—a context where such connections
were in some circumstances problematic and were believed to be so by only a minority of
academics.
Furthermore, our understanding of modern science is shaped by an implicit, often
simplistic and naive, understanding of the economic impact of research and of the funding
of research, rather than on empirically based studies of these relations. The economy and
money are not missing from studies; rather, they are present in particular, often unhelpful,
forms; the focus on money on campus draws too much from varieties of what might be
called the spontaneous economics of academic research scientists. Broadly speaking, this
downplays the importance of filthy lucre in “science,” while overestimating the economic
and other impacts of academic research compared with industrial and governmental
research and other forms of inventive activity. Of course professional historians of science
know that accounts given by scientists of the social, economic, political, and other
relations of science are not a reliable guide to reality, and they have certainly challenged
the idea of academic research as pure. And yet, they are perhaps not sufficiently aware of
the extent to which particular scientists’ conceptions of what constitutes science have
constrained inquiry. At the most trivial level, this has involved relying on academic
physicists’ testimony about levels of funding. All sorts of claims are made for the
significance of the cancellation of the Superconducting Super Collider in 1993; yet that
did not signal the end or even the decline of federal funding. There was growth in every
year from 1975 to 2005 in federally funded “basic research” in universities and colleges
in the United States (data before and after 1997 are not strictly comparable).3 Worse still,
historians’ own often crude accounts of what some scientists believed have come to define
historiographic agendas.4 In what follows, my comments should be understood as re-
2 Dominique Pestre, Sciences, argent et politique: Un essai d’interpre´tation (Paris: INRA, 2003); and Philip
Mirowski, Science-Mart: Privatizing American Science (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2011).
3
“National Patterns of R&D Resources: 2008 Data Update Detailed Statistical Tables,” NSF 10-314, Mar.
2010, Table 6: U.S. Basic Research Expenditures, by Source of Funds and Performing Sector: 1953–2008
[Constant 2000 U.S. Dollars], http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf10314/pdf/nsf10314.pdf. See also Daniel Green-
berg, “Government-Funded Basic Research in the United States,” in Research Budgets in an Age of Limits: Basic
Science—Health—Culture, ed. Klaus-Dirk Henke, Hans-Liudger Dienel, and Arthur P. Molella (Baden-Baden:
Nomos, 2000).
4 This is the burden of David Edgerton, “‘The Linear Model’ Did Not Exist: Reflections on the History and
Historiography of Science and Research in Industry in the Twentieth Century,” in The Science–Industry Nexus:
History, Policy, Implications, ed. Karl Grandin and Nina Wormbs (New York: Watson, 2005), pp. 31–57.
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stricted to the history and historiography of the twentieth century, since for earlier periods
my argument would necessarily be different. This essay is thus a plea not only for taking
the economy seriously, but also for understanding the specificities of the relations of
science and the economy in the twentieth century.
There was an important Marxist tradition in thinking about the relations of science, the
economy, and society that gave rise, from the 1930s, to rich new histories of science and
studies of science policy that yielded and stimulated quantitative estimates of the volume
of research both in and out of the academy. This is not the place to track the well-known
vicissitudes of Marxist analyses of science and its history, but it is important to note that
in its late incarnations Western Marxism had shunned both vulgar economism and
political economy; the left began reading the color supplements rather than the economics
pages: it discovered consumption and abandoned production and politics as passe´. This is
not to say that the Marxism of the 1970s and 1980s did not have brilliantly productive
moments, particularly in the study of labor processes—it most certainly did, and it did
influence certain strands in the history of science.5 More generally, the 1970s and 1980s
saw fresh and powerful studies of corporate research.6 Yet despite the increasing interest
in technoscience, the economy and studies of nonacademic research have become less
prominent.
It is significant that in the last thirty years there has been a vast expansion in the economics
of innovation and also the beginnings of an economics of science. The former has been
technocratic and nationalist in character and hostile to neoclassical economics. On the other
hand, there has been a powerful renewal in the neoliberal political economy of science.7
Neither, however, has had a significant influence on the historical study of science, although
the assumptions of both are present, transmitted in general through scientists.
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE IDEOLOGY OF THE SCIENTISTS
It is a cliche´ that economists—indeed, many social scientists—have wanted to ape natural
scientists, and there is now a rich historical literature on the relations between the two.8 There
was traffic the other way, too, from political economy to natural science, the most famous
instance being Darwin’s theory of evolution. There is, however, another class of relations that
seem to be important—the relations of discourses about science and society and broader
political economic discourse. For students of science and scientists, it may be too tempting to
see scientists’ more general ideas as scientism, rather than as what they more often are—
versions of commonplace ideas. Victorian scientists’ hostility to state funding of research was
an instance of general attitudes to the state; the change in attitudes toward economic nation-
alism before the Great War was similarly not specifically scientific. That J. D. Bernal’s Social
Function of Science (1939) is derivative of standard Marxist analyses of monopoly capitalism,
imperialism, and militarism is pretty obvious; he is trying to show scientists that the only way
5 Les Levidow and Bob Young, eds., Science, Technology, and the Labour Process (Marxist Studies, 1)
(London: CSE Books, 1981); and Gary Werskey, “The Marxist Critique of Capitalist Science: A History in Three
Movements?” Science as Culture, 2007, 16:397–461.
6 See the review by Michael Aaron Dennis, “Accounting for Research: New Histories of Corporate Labora-
tories and the Social History of American Science,” Social Studies of Science, 1987, 17:479–518.
7 The most brilliant work has been that of Terence Kealey, The Economic Laws of Scientific Research
(London: Macmillan, 1996); see also Kealey, Sex, Science, and Profits (London: Heinemann, 2008).
8 Philip Mirowski, More Heat than Light: Economics as Social Physics, Physics as Nature’s Economics
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989); and Margaret Schabas, The Natural Origins of Economics (Chicago:
Univ. Chicago Press, 2005).
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to free science is to abolish capitalism. Similarly, the anti-planners of the Society for Freedom
in Science did not invent their own theory of free science but found one in Austrian
economics.9 Perhaps the most powerful political economy has not dared to speak its name:
many scientific intellectuals reproduced standard economic nationalism, which became central
to a species of economics of innovation.10
In each of these modes, and to various degrees, the scientific intellectuals overempha-
sized academic research. Bernal, for all his critique of pure science and his pioneering
quantification of research funding, seriously underreported industrial research and high-
lighted military funding as part of his critique of capitalism (see below). The neoliberal
anti-planners were concerned with pure academic research—everything else was tech-
nology and was ignored. The more nationalist of thinkers were perhaps overwhelmingly
more inclusive, but the key cases remained academic ones.
That money, the economy, and business have been so integral a part of science does not
mean that economists have dealt with them adequately. Thus the most famous instance of
economic analysis of science—the market failure argument for its funding by the state—
assumes that it is a nonappropriable public good, pure information, like the light from a
lighthouse. Some scientific knowledge may be like that, but hardly all or even most of it.
In any case, though the argument gives a rationale for the funding of some research by
states, it does not explain why and how states actually funded research, which they did
long before the argument was thought of. In any case, the analysis would suggest that
particular states should not fund research, since the knowledge thus produced is by the
principle invoked freely available to other states.11 What implicit or explicit economic
ideas about research have been in play in actual research policies of states is hardly
addressed in either the economics or the history of science or science policy literature.12
Furthermore, economic histories (and the economics of science and technology) have
too often relied on received accounts of well-known innovations rather than examining
innovation afresh for themselves.13 They have also often incorporated the seemingly
9 David Edgerton and Kirsty Hughes, “The Poverty of Science: A Critical Analysis of Scientific and Industrial
Policy under Mrs. Thatcher,” Public Administration, 1989, 67:419–433; and Jessica Reinisch, “The Society for
Freedom in Science, 1940–1963” (M.Sc. thesis, Univ. London, 2000). See also Richard Cockett, Thinking the
Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic Counterrevolution, 1931–1983 (1994; London: Fontana, 1995);
Frances Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper? (London: Granta, 2000); Philip Mirowski, The Effortless
Economy of Science? (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 2004); Mirowski, Science-Mart (cit. n. 2); and Adrian
Johns, Death of a Pirate: British Radio and the Making of the Information Age (New York: Norton, 2010).
10 The term “national systems of innovation” was coined in the 1980s by Christopher Freeman and has been
much used since, though without its ideological baggage always being clear. Freeman espoused a national
political economy of technology, drawing on Friedrich List, the nineteenth-century German advocate of what
Roman Szporluk called “scientific nationalism.” See Simon Lee, “Industrial Policy and British Decline,” in
Andrew Cox, Lee, and Joe Sanderson, The Political Economy of Modern Britain (Cheltenham: Elgar, 1997); and
Lee, “British Culture and Economic Decline,” ibid. On List see Roman Szporluk, “Thoughts about Change:
Ernest Gellner and the History of Nationalism,” in The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of
Nationalism, ed. John A. Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998), pp. 23–39.
11 R. R. Nelson, “The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research,” Journal of Political Economy, 1959,
67:297–306; K. J. Arrow, “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inventions,” in The Rate and
Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, ed. Nelson (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press
for the NBER, 1962); David Hounshell, “The Cold War, RAND, and the Generation of Knowledge, 1946–
1962,” Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, 1997, 27:237–267; and Hounshell, “The
Medium is the Message; or, How Context Matters: The RAND Corporation Builds an Economics of Innovation,
1946–1962,” in Systems, Experts, and Computers, ed. Agatha C. Hughes and Thomas P. Hughes (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 255–310.
12 Sabine Clarke, “Pure Science with a Practical Aim: The Meanings of Fundamental Research in Britain, c.
1916–1950,” Isis, 2010, 101:285–311, is a notable exception.
13 David Edgerton, “Innovation, Technology, or History: What Is the Historiography of Technology About?”
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common-sense assumption of a positive correlation between national investment in
research and development (expressed as a percentage of GDP) and national rates of
economic growth. Thus Germany and America grew fast in the early years of the twentieth
century because of rapid national innovation; Britain grew slowly because of poor or
misdirected innovation.14 Surprise is expressed at low Japanese growth in recent years,
despite its huge R&D spending, which is second only to that of the United States in scale.
In fact—and for very good reasons—there is if anything an inverse correlation between
national rates of growth and national innovation.15 Some economic analysis seemingly
ignored what might have been another obvious fact—that as R&D expenditure increased
in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, rates of economic growth in the countries funding high
levels of R&D fell below what they had been in earlier decades.
We also need to be very careful not to attribute undue significance to standard measures
that are at the core of economic analysis. The use of comparisons of R&D intensity (R&D
expenditure as a percentage of GDP, say) owes more to the fact that these one-dimensional
numbers avoid all the problems of comparison of prices than to any satisfactory analysis
of what the significance of the ratio might be. Counts of patents assume that patents reflect
technical novelty, yet they notoriously do not. Furthermore, the financial importance of an
individual patent is not a measure of its technical significance.16
MONEY, TIME, AND HISTORY
As historians, we chart variations in ideas and practices over time and space. But there are
further axes that we can use to inform our analyses—for example, economic development. A
vulgar version of this idea might suppose that a wealthy country’s past is a poorer country’s
present: “de te fabula narratr”—the tale is told of you—wrote Marx to explain to his German
readers the significance of his earlier British cases.17 In the terms of later economic commen-
tary, countries always industrialize, they urbanize, they undergo demographic transitions, they
turn into service economies, and so on. One way of expressing this would be to say that
development follows not time or virtue or piety but, say, income per head (measured, perhaps,
as GDP per head). Of course, there are powerful objections to such a determinist model (for
example, Bogota in 2000 is not like London in 1900), but leaving out the money is about as
silly as leaving out the time we historians so dutifully record.
Take the case of the development of the universities of Christendom. In 1500 universities
were concentrated in Western Europe, stretching to Prague and Vienna. Before going east,
they spread west to Spanish colonies in the Americas. Royal and pontifical universities were
founded in Lima and in Mexico in 1551; a university was founded in Co´rdoba (now
Argentina) in 1622, predating Harvard (1636) and anything in the Russian Empire (St.
Petersburg and Moscow universities were founded in 1724 and 1755). Leo´n, in Nicaragua,
Technology and Culture, 2010, 51:680–697. For the economics of innovation see, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall and
Nathan Rosenberg, Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: North Holland, 2010).
14 For a critique of these literatures see David Edgerton, Science, Technology, and the British Industrial
“Decline,” 1870–1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996).
15 For surprise at Japan’s low growth see Ben Steil, David G. Victor, and Richard R. Nelson, eds., Techno-
logical Innovation and Economic Performance (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2002). Regarding the
inverse correlation between rates of growth and innovation see Edgerton, Science, Technology, and the British
Industrial “Decline,” 1870–1970; and Kealey, Economic Laws of Scientific Research (cit. n. 7).
16 Christopher Beauchamp, “The Telephone Patents: Intellectual Property, Business, and the Law in the United
States and Britain, 1876–1900” (Ph.D. diss., Univ. Cambridge, 2007).
17 Karl Marx, preface to the first German edition of Capital, reproduced and translated into English in, e.g.,
Marx, Capital: A New Abridgement (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995).
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hosted a university from 1816, long before most western or southern parts of the United States
and the same year as Warsaw. There was a university in Montevideo (1849) before there was
one in Manchester. We might refine the picture by considering the emergence of the research
university. The few research universities of the late nineteenth century were mostly new and
were in Britain, the United States, and Germany. As other places achieved the levels of income
per head these countries had in 1900 (very roughly speaking), they too developed research
universities. Thus it is only now that Colombia is producing large numbers of Ph.D.’s and that
its elite professoriate is qualified with the Ph.D.
We may note that the research-oriented international rankings (and the ranking of
scientific research is central) of universities correlate rather better with income per head
in the host nation than with age of university. The list of the highest-ranking universities
is of course full of U.S. institutions, which are overwhelmingly younger than the his-
panophone universities of the Americas. In a 2011 ranking, the first and only Latin
American universities to appear in the top two hundred, sharing 169th place, are the
Universidad Nacional Auto´noma de Me´xico (the oldest university in North America,
founded in 1551) and the University of Sao Paolo (the oldest in Brazil, founded in 1934).
They are also outranked by many new Asian universities. The old universities of Britain
and the United States are very high on the list, but even the new universities in those
nations trump the great majority of medieval and early modern foundations—say, Sala-
manca or Bologna. Within a two-hundred-mile radius of New York, London, and central
California, one can find well over half of the top-rated—say, the top twenty—universities
in the world. We might note also that U.S. universities rose to world dominance long after
U.S. industry and agriculture and that the growth of Asian tigers and Latin American
economies was hardly due to their new or ancient universities; the latter benefited more
from the former than vice versa. It was money that brought academics to California, just
as it was money that brought Old Masters to the new art galleries of Philadelphia and
Buenos Aires and Impressionists to the Hermitage. And, indeed, great corporations started
doing research rather than becoming large and rich through research. (See Figure 1.)
FOLLOW THE MONEY: MONEY AS TOOL OF CRITIQUE
In the Watergate case, the informant Deep Throat was not willing to tell his story, only to
confirm whether Bob Woodward was on the right track; his famous injunction as to how
to get the story was “Follow the money!” This technique has long been used in similar
circumstances by analysts of science and by historians when they have wanted to get at
the story of science where the funding agencies and recipients were not frank. There has
been a long-standing tradition, dating back to at least the 1930s, that pointed to the
significance of what it took to be tainted industrial and military money in funding research.
In a pioneering early 1930s survey of funding, the biologist Julian Huxley noted,
If you are willing to pay for more men and more facilities in war research than in, say, medical
research, you will get more results adapted to killing people and less adapted to keeping them
alive. And it is when we look at the amounts of expenditure in different fields that we begin
to realise what a large share of the nation’s scientific brains is occupied with war. It is very
difficult to obtain exact figures; but I have attempted to reach rough estimates which I think are
not too far from actuality to be of service. I submit them with reserve, and as subject to an error
of at least 15 to 20 per cent. For research in industry, and in the sciences mainly basic to
industry, like physics and chemistry, the country spends perhaps 21⁄4 or 21⁄2 millions a year.
War research comes next to this, with certainly over a million pounds, perhaps a million and
a half. Research in agriculture and the agricultural side of biology take somewhere around
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three-quarters of a million; research in health and the physiological side of biology about half
a million or probably less. And research in the specifically human sciences like psychology and
sociology probably accounts for well under a hundred thousand. Money talks: and these figures
tell a tale. Science is being applied on a large scale to the ends of destruction, not because
science is essentially destructive or scientists particularly militarist, but because the nation,
through its appointed government, is paying handsomely to secure that it shall be so applied.18
In The Social Function of Science, J. D. Bernal also highlighted the extent to which British
research was funded by the military: “It would not be unfair to say that something between
one-third and one-half of the money spent on scientific research in Britain is spent directly
or indirectly on war research. . . . And this in peace time.” He estimated that there were
842 scientists doing research for the services, spending some £1.5 million, out of a total
war research and development budget of £2.8 million.19 In the late 1940s and early 1950s,
Bernal was one of the very few to point out that British research was highly militarized—
again by pointing to the money. He thought this was a very bad thing, but unavoidable
under capitalism.
18 Julian Huxley, “Peace through Science,” in Philip Noel-Baker et al., Challenge to Death (London:
Constable, 1934), pp. 292–293.
19 J. D. Bernal, The Social Function of Science (London: Routledge, 1939), pp. 173 (quotation), 427–428. The
figures are for 1937.
Figure 1. Bell Labs, Murray Hill, New Jersey, through a window of the Acoustics Laboratory
(1942). Gottscho-Schleisner Collection, Library of Congress, LC-G612-42356.
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In the 1980s, historians writing about the 1940s and 1950s used the same technique. Paul
Forman wrote of scientists’ “false consciousness, which succeeded so well in what it was
intended to do, to mislead others even as it blinded themselves” about the realities and scale
of the links between postwar (academic) physics and the military. He thus looked to money
to demonstrate the extent of the influence of the military. Forman showed just how vital
defense dollars were for U.S. university research in physics after the war—so much so as to
create “a physics as the military funding agencies would have wished.” Academic physics was
not in command, it was being used; and physicists “had lost control of their discipline.” There
are many other fine studies of the “patronage” of particular fields by the military. More
recently, Philip Mirowski has followed the money (like Forman, he has done much else
besides, of course) as part of a critique of recent science. Mirowski sees a transition from
federally funded (including military) research to corporate funding that requires appropriable
rather than public knowledge to be produced.20 (see Figure 2)
FOLLOWING THE MONEY TO UNDERMINE CLICHE´ S
It might be thought that as a result of such studies we have a good picture of “science and the
military,” as the phrase goes. Yet we do not, for the great majority of such studies are
concerned with only a minor aspect of the relations of science and the military, which merely
appear to exhaust the issue. What we have are studies of the impact of the military on science
on the university campus, a particular story about a particular part of the relationship that
stands for the whole. We need to follow all the money, not just that going to the university.21
Rough estimates of the comparative scale of industrial, government, and academic research
through the century show that the usual implicit maps of the historians systematically oversize
academic research by comparison with government and industrial research.22 Industry and the
military (largely in industry) have been—nearly everywhere and nearly always—the main
funders of research and development. Not only research within the academy but, indeed, those
aspects of academic research least connected to industry are oversized—physics, particularly
particle physics, and biology, particularly molecular biology—while chemistry, mathematics,
and engineering are undersized. Similar distortions are at work for research that takes place
outside the academy. The research and development part of the Manhattan Project is routinely
oversized because of the tendency to picture the whole project as a research and development
effort. But most of the $2 billion the whole project cost went to build two nuclear factories at
Oak Ridge and Hanford, an effort undertaken by large corporations, including DuPont; the
20 Paul Forman, “Behind Quantum Electronics: National Security as a Basis for Physical Research in the
United States, 1940–1960,” Hist. Stud. Phys. Biol. Sci., 1987, 18:149–229, on pp. 228, 224, 239; Ronald E.
Doel, “Constituting the Postwar Earth Sciences: The Military’s Influence on the Environmental Sciences in the
USA after 1945,” Soc. Stud. Sci., 2003, 33:635–666 (in a special issue on “Earth Sciences in the Cold War”);
and Mirowski, Science-Mart (cit. n. 2).
21 This is the burden of Forman, “Behind Quantum Electronics”; and Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and
American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York: Columbia Univ.
Press, 1993), which recognizes in the first few pages that most R&D was not academic. See also Everett
Mendelsohn, Merritt Roe Smith, and Peter Weingart, eds., Science, Technology, and the Military, 2 vols.
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988); the journal Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, for the 1990s
in particular; and the special issue on “Science in the Cold War,” Soc. Stud. Sci., 2001, 31.
22 See David Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane: An Essay on a Militant and Technological Nation
(London: Macmillan, 1991); Edgerton, Science, Technology, and the British Industrial “Decline,” 1870–1970
(cit. n. 14), p. 11; and Edgerton, “Science in the United Kingdom: A Case Study in the Nationalisation of
Science,” in Science in the Twentieth Century, ed. John Krige and Dominique Pestre (London: Harwood, 1997),
pp. 759–776, for examples of this.
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research and development part of the project came to a mere $70 million.23 Assuming that each
type of bomb cost $35 million to develop, this was around ten times the development cost of
the DC4 aircraft of the late 1930s. Furthermore, it represented only a small fraction of overall
warlike R&D expenditure in the United States: in fiscal year 1945 the Office of Scientific
Research and Development spent around $100 million, while the U.S. Army and Navy spent
$700 million on research and development alone.24 Many other initiatives and policies are
given undue prominence and significance in historical treatments as well.
Vannevar Bush was very clear, in his Science, the Endless Frontier (1945), about the
funding of research in the United States. Paying attention to this will help us understand
what he was proposing and avoid misunderstanding as to the scope of his proposals. He
observed, “Expenditures for scientific research by industry and Government—almost
entirely applied research—have more than doubled between 1930 and 1940. Whereas in
1930 they were six times as large as the research expenditures of the colleges, universities,
and research institutes, by 1940 they were nearly ten times as large.” The war made things
worse: “We have been living on our fat. For more than 5 years many of our scientists have
been fighting the war in the laboratories, in the factories and shops, and at the front. . . .
They have been diverted to a greater extent than is generally appreciated from the search
23 These figures come from the remarkable Brookings Institution study by Stephen I. Schwartz, Atomic Audit:
The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons since 1940 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution
Press, 1998), Table 1-1, p. 60. The research and development figure may be an underestimate, but it is worth
noting that the cost given for “Los Alamos Project” is $74 million, a sum that is additional to the R&D total.
24 Forman, “Behind Quantum Electronics” (cit. n. 20), p. 152.
Figure 2. A geologist, employed by a U.S. oil company, with his “rod man,” looking for oil in the
United States, circa 1944. Library of Congress, LC-USW4-029549.
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for answers to the fundamental problems—from the search on which human welfare and
progress depends.” The key point was that “if the colleges, universities, and research
institutes are to meet the rapidly increasing demands of industry and Government for new
scientific knowledge, their basic research should be strengthened by use of public
funds.”25 Bush was arguing for the public support of basic research in universities at a time
when he thought the growth in such research had failed to keep up with the huge rises in
government and industrial research, both of which were overwhelmingly and necessarily
“applied.” He did not (as many later analysts have done when thinking in terms of the
“linear model”) conflate policy for academic research with policy for innovation. Nor, in
any case, did the Bush-inspired National Science Foundation (NSF) dominate funding
even of academic basic research. Even in the early 1960s, the NSF supported less than 10
percent of all basic research and less than 15 percent of all federally funded basic research.
The Department of Defense was still supporting as much as 44 percent of federally funded
basic research in universities and colleges in 1958.26
Older studies of the patronage of British science in the twentieth century overempha-
sized the most visible agencies, like the National Physical Laboratory, the Department of
Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), and the Medical Research Council. A little
accounting vitiated any claim to the centrality of these organisms: the military depart-
ments of state spent more even on civil research and development; industry spent more
than the state; and so on. Looking at the money and who controlled it made it obvious that
there was no single research policy, nor did the supposed principles that guided such
policy apply to most research funders.27 This was a matter not just of recognizing the
significance of the military and of industry, but of noting funding expended for imperial
purposes and the huge sums spent for forgotten industries like whaling.28
Why is it important to get this right? Essentially, because there are great dangers in
generalizing from often atypical cases (the academy, the NSF, the DSIR) that are taken to
be of central importance. Moreover, there is a danger of misunderstanding the wider
research contexts for any particular form of research. To illustrate: the suggestion that the
production of knowledge was until recently characterized as, say, “Mode 1” is problematic
because it should be obvious that there were many different ways in which knowledge was
produced in the past. Even had it been the case that academic research could be charac-
terized as Mode 1—which is doubtful indeed—the whole of knowledge production could
not. To put it another way, the still-common suggestion that the science policies of Britain
and the United States have been governed, since 1918 or 1945, by notions labeled “the
Haldane principle” or “the linear model” is vitiated by the fact that if these ideas existed
at all (which, again, is very doubtful) they applied to only a small proportion even of
state-sponsored, much less industrially supported, research. In other words, serious cate-
gory errors are easily committed.
25 Vannevar Bush, Science, the Endless Frontier (1945; Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation,
1960), p. 7.
26 Bruce L. R. Smith, American Science Policy since World War Two (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 1990), p. 51 (NSF support of basic research); and Harvey M. Sapolsky, Science for the Navy:
A History of the Office of Naval Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1990), Table A-5, p. 137
(Department of Defense support of basic research). More generally, see Donald E. Stokes, Pasteur’s Quadrant:
Basic Science and Technological Innovation (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997).
27 Edgerton, Science, Technology, and the British Industrial “Decline,” 1870–1970 (cit. n. 14).
28 Sabine Clarke, “A Technocratic Imperial State? The Colonial Office and Scientific Research, 1940–1960,”
Twentieth Century British History, 2007, 18:453–480; and D. Graham Burnett, The Sounding of the Whale:
Science and Cetaceans in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press, 2012).
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TURNING IT AROUND
The distancing of science and scientists from filthy lucre has relied on a successful
program of identifying science as a whole with that part of it that has been outside the
direct control of powerful economic agents like industry, the military, and so on.
Distinguishing something called “science” from something called “technology” has
thus been peculiarly important and helps explain hostility to the idea of technoscience
and Mode 2 science. Academic scientists have not been the only ones involved in this
task. Academic sociologists of science of the 1950s followed academic scientists in
assuming that there was a major cultural gap between the ethos of the scientist
(understood as a university researcher) and that of the practitioners of science in
industry and government. In the 1970s this assumption was found not to hold, and yet
it has continued to inform commentary on science and industry.29 Rare have been the
historians and sociologists of science who have pointed to the limitations of the
academic-centered view; rarer still are those who note that the implied asymmetry is
misplaced. Steven Shapin has recovered a whole history of academic commentary on
industrial science and, in a study of the present, directly challenged the still flourishing
assumption of a radical difference between the commercial and the academic contexts
for scientific research, at least of the sort that are usually suggested. In an earlier
precocious and pointed essay, Michael Aaron Dennis, analyzing new histories of
industrial research in the contexts of science around 1900, made the devastating
observation that research was only part of a scientist’s work, whether in the academy
or in industry, but that for select individuals industry provided not only a higher salary
but also time and equipment to pursue research that universities would not then
support.30 We urgently need to recognize that most scientific research activity has been
conducted for economic and military purposes and that pecuniary rewards—whether
in the form of patents or otherwise— have been central, whether that research was
conducted in industry, in government, or in universities. For most scientists a direct
connection to mammon has been the norm rather than the exception.
Our knowledge of scientists pursuing standard careers in industry and in government is
very limited. Yet our historical image of the scientist could usefully start with them. Our
understanding of the history of invention and innovation, and the place of scientific
research—whether in government, industry, or the academy—in it, should be our starting
point for thinking about the sources of invention. Yet we are still mired in cliche´d stage
theories, where the individual inventor gives way to the corporate R&D laboratory and, in
the academic case, Mode 1 is replaced by Mode 2; in notions of very dubious value, like
the linear model; or in limited criticisms of these models.31 While some important work
is adumbrating these issues in a broad range of cases, from histories of corporate R&D to
29 See Stephen F. Cotgrove and Steven Box, Science, Industry, and Society: Studies in the Sociology of Science
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1970); and S. B. Barnes, “Making Out in Industrial Research,” Science Studies, 1971,
1:157–175.
30 Steven Shapin, The Scientific Life: A Moral History of a Late Modern Vocation (Chicago: Univ. Chicago
Press, 2008) (see also Paul Lucier, “The Professional and the Scientist in Nineteenth-Century America,” Isis,
2009, 100:699–732); and Dennis, “Accounting for Research” (cit. n. 6).
31 Hermione Giffard, “The Development and Production of Turbojet Aero-Engines in Britain, Germany, and
the United States, 1936–1945” (Ph.D. diss., Imperial College, 2011); Philip Scranton, “Technology-Led
Innovation: The Non-Linearity of U.S. Jet Propulsion Development,” History and Technology, 2006, 22:337–
367; and Scranton, “Mastering Failure: Technological and Organisational Challenges in British and American
Military Jet Propulsion, 1943–57,” Business History, 2011, 53:479–504.
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the rich literature on, for example, scientific knowledge, political economy, and plant
breeding, there is much more to be done.32 Similarly, we are just at the beginning of asking
historical questions as to why firms and governments have funded research, how they have
done so, and how they have understood what they were doing. We need not so much an
economic history of science as, instead, a history of science in the economy.33 Activists
have been much more prominent than historians in addressing key questions about how
inventiveness has changed over time and about the nature of what is invented and sold, as
exemplified by rich recent commentary on the pharmaceutical industry.34
CONCLUSION
My point is not that money has not been studied but, rather, that it has been inserted into
an old story. We need to follow the money to a new story, to a new map. This is not just
a question of extending the range of history of science to neglected aspects of scientific
research; we need to reconsider both the whole and well-known parts. We need to
recognize the breadth and variety of “science” and the centrality of the economic to most
of it. For all the invocation of “technoscience,” of the military, and of the economy, we
assume far too readily that academic research stands for science. The problem is likely to
persist. “Science” is still implicitly defined in relation to academic research, and this
“science” still has relations with what are taken to be external economies, publics,
societies, states, and the military; it is this “science” that becomes “techno-science.”
Research agendas for history of science are set more by concerns about this “science” and
its relations than by any richer historical conception of what we have long known about
knowledge creation.35 It is perhaps for this reason that there is so much resistance to views
that challenge the centrality of the academy and associated ideas about the prevalence of
linear models and the supposed primacy of science in the years after World War II.36 A
refreshed history of twentieth-century science will become possible only if it is liberated
from the boundaries and emphases imposed by conceptions of science insisted on by
academic scientists of the past; following the money can indicate just how significant a
change that might involve.
32 Kees Gispen, Poems in Steel: National Socialism and the Politics of Inventing from Weimar to Bonn
(Oxford: Berghahn, 2001); Jonathan Harwood, Technology’s Dilemma: Agricultural Colleges between Science
and Practice in Germany, 1860–1934 (Oxford: Lang, 2005); Harwood, “The Fate of Peasant-Friendly Plant-
Breeding in Nazi Germany,” Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences, 2010, 40:570–604; and Paolo Palladino,
“Science, Technology, and the Economy: Plant Breeding in Great Britain, 1920–1970,” Economic History
Review, 1996, 49:116–136.
33 Clarke, “Pure Science with a Practical Aim” (cit. n. 12); and Mirowski, Science-Mart (cit. n. 2), esp. Ch. 2.
34 David Edgerton, The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History since 1900 (Oxford: Oxford Univ.
Press, 2007); Tyler Cohen, The Great Stagnation: How America Ate All the Low-Hanging Fruit of Modern
History, Got Sick, and Will (Eventually) Feel Better (New York: Dutton, 2011); James Le Fanu, The Rise and
Fall of Modern Medicine, 2nd ed. (London: Abacus, 2011); Mirowski, Science-Mart; Marcia Angell, The Truth
about the Drug Companies: How They Deceive Us and What to Do About It (New York: Random House, 2004);
Angell, “The Illusions of Psychiatry,” New York Review of Books, 14 July 2011; and Angell, “The Epidemic of
Mental Illness: Why?” ibid., 23 June 2011.
35 Edgerton, “Innovation, Technology, or History” (cit. n. 13).
36 See Paul Forman, “The Primacy of Science in Modernity, of Technology in Postmodernity, and of Ideology
in the History of Technology,” Hist. & Technol., 2007, 23:1–152; and Mirowski, Science-Mart (cit. n. 2).
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